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ARTICLES
CONFRONTATION AS REJOINDER TO
COMPROMISE: REFLECTIONS ON THE
LITTLE ROCK DESEGREGATION CRISIS*

Raymond

T.

Diamond**

In September 1957, soldiers of the IOI st Airborne Division of the United
States Army were called to duty i n hostile territory.

These soldiers were

called to Little Rock, Arkansas, to keep safe nine Black children who, under a
court order of desegregation, attended Little Rock's Central High School. 1
The Little Rock crisis is writ large in the history of the desegregation of
the American South. Because many of the events of the crisis were performed
before the television camera at a time when television was new, the Little
Rock crisis was etched graphically in the American consciousness. 2 The cam
era showed in violent detail the will i ngness of the South to maintain segrega
tion, and the willingness of the federal government to support federal law.
Many books have been published regarding the Little Rock crisis. Daisy
Bates wrote

The Long Shadow of Little Rock,

A

Memoir

from her perspective

as a leader of the Arkansas branch of the National Association for the Ad
vancement of Colored People (NAACP).3 Brooks Hays4 and Orval Faubus5
have provided the perspective of elected officials who influenced the event of
Little Rock.

Virgil Blossom wrote as a superintendent of schools who at

tempted to implement a "go slow" desegregation plan which would recognize
the mandate of

Brown

v.

Board of Education 6

but still take advantage of the

The ideas i n Part III of this essay were presented in earlier form a t the July 1987 annual
*
meeting of the American Association of L a w Librarians, and comments there received are
acknowledged.

**
Assistant Professor, Louisiana State U niversity Law Center. B.A. 1973, J.D. 1977 Yale Uni
versity. The author acknowledges also the research assistance of Michael Colvin, J.D., L.S.U. 1986;
Brett Beyer III, J.D., L.S.U. 1987; and Karen Hayne, L.S.U. Class of 1989.

I. E x ec. Order No. 10,730, Sept. 24, 1957, 2 2 F.R. 7628 (1957). D. Eisenhower, Radio and
Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Little Rock, 1957 PUBLIC PAPERS OF
THE PRES IDENTS: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 689 (1957) (hereinafter cited as 1957 PUBLIC PA

PERS). See also
Proclamation 3,204, Sept. 24, 1957, 22 F.R. 7628 (1957) .
2. The power of these television images is presented in "Fighting Back (1957-62)," Eyes on the
.
Prize: America's Civil
Rights Years, 1954-65 (PBS television broadcast, January 28, 1986) (videotape
available throu gh PBS Adult Learning Services). See also J. WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE AME RICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965 (1987) (hereinafter cited as EYES ON THE PRIZE).

0. BATES, THE LONG SHADOW Of LITTLE RO C K, A MEMOI R (1982).
4. B. HAYS, POLITICS IS MY PARISH, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1981), and B. HAYS, A SOUTH
ERN MODE RATE
SPEAKS (1959). Hays was a member of Congress who lost his seat because he
counseled modera
tion.
5. 0. FAUBUS, DOWN FROM THE HILLS (1980). Faubus was a governor who pioneered what
came to be
known as massive resistance.
3.

[ . . 6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (hereinafter cited as Brown[). Brown I declared "(s]eparate educational
ac1ht1es are inherently
unequal." Brown I at 347 U.S. 494.
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was frustrated from
weaknesses of Brown's implementation formula,7 and who
at
Central High is the
Crisis
y's
Huckab
h
Elizabet
even this minimal attempt.8
critical period, an
the
during
High
account of an assistant principa l at Central
o use gates
schoolh
the
eyewitness account of what happened not just outside
but also what happened behind the schoolhouse's closed doors.9

None of these authors have attempted to explain the Little Rock crisis in
constitutional terms. Content to describe events and explain them as they un
derstood them, these authors have the gift and the limitation of personal per
spective. Not even Tony Preyer's The Little Rock Crisis A Constitutional
Interpretation, 10 written from the perspective of an objective observer, fully
explains the constitutional significance of Little Rock. Instead it performs the
same descriptive task as the participants in this crisis, but paints a more global
picture.

This Article speaks to this lacuna in our understandi ng of the events of
Little Rock. The remainder of this Article is divided into four parts. Part I
describes the events of the Little Rock crisis. Part II suggests the implications
of Brown v. Board's implementation formula as a factor contributing to the
character and the severity of the Little Rock crisis. Part III examines the
constitutional basis of interposition and the concept of localism as a justifica
tion for resistance in Little Rock.

The concluding section speaks to the question which the Little Rock cri
sis begged and which was answered by the Supreme Court in Cooper v.
Aaron, 11 whether the pronouncements of the Supreme Court deserve recogni
tion as the law of the land.
I.

PEOPLE AND EVENTS

The seeds of the crisis in Little Rock were planted the day after Brown v.
7. Desegregation was to take place not immediately but "with all deliberate speed" 349 U.S.
294, 300 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Brown II) and ..as soon as practicable" Id. at 299.
8. V. BLOSSOM, IT HAS HAPPENED HERE (1959).
9.

E. HUCKABY, CRISIS AT CENTRAL HIGH (1980).

10.

T. FREYER, THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1984). The
subtitle is deceiving. THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS is not a constitutional interpretation, instead a ren

dering of the facts and their political/sociological explanations. Freyer's intent was to ..approach the
integration conflict in terms of the interplay of local politics and judicial process." Id. at ix. He
explores through the hiswry of the Little Rock crisis "the relationship between change imposed
through law and that achieved through moral principle." Id. at 4. Though THE LITTLE ROCK
CRISIS performs the same task as have the works of the participants who have written on the crisis, it

not only ben efits from a more global perspective, but it is a book with more factual depth, having the
benefit of access t o records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, private records of the National
Assoc1at1on for the Advancement of Colored People and private legal files. Jd. at ix. I. SPITZBERG,
JR., RACIAL POLITICS IN LITTLE ROCK, 1954-1967 (1987), covers the crisis as part of a more exten
.
st1ve llme. period of examination.
Other non-participants have published on the subject of the Little
Rock cns1s but have not had the benefit of Freyer's sources. See, e.g., c. SILVERMAN, THE LITTLE
ROCK STORY. Add!l1onally they have attempted to view Little Rock not a s
an isolated topic of a
aJ O work but hav� w ntten �hapters on Llltle Rock in books on
larger topics. See, e.g., N. BAR
·
I LE),
THE R I S E Of MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE S OUTH DURING THE
l 950's (1969); E. JACOWBY and 0. COLBURN, SOUTHERN BUSINESSMEN
AND DESEGREGATION
(19.82); A. BICKEi., THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); J. PELTASON, FIFTY EIGHT LONELY
MEN (1961): F. R1 ... AD, L. MCGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED (1978)·
0. HAN DLIN FIRE BELL IN
THE NIGHT (1964 ): bur cf. ARKANSAS GAZETTE , CRISIS
IN THE SouT : THE LITT E ROCK STORY
(1958); H. ALEXANDER. THE LITTLE ROCK RECALL ELECTION (1960) .
11. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).

rn �

�

:
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12
was rendered in 1954. On May 17, 1954, Brown I, as it later was
Board
called, laid to rest the constitut ional doctrine of "separate but equal," recog
nized by Plessy v. Ferguson, 11 declaring instead that "[s]eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal." 14 On May 18th, the Little Rock school

bo ard instructed its superintendent, Virgil Blossom, "to develop a plan consis
tent with the Court's order," and by the end of the month school officials had
issue d a public statement committing Little Rock to desegregation.15
By fall of 1954, Superintendent Blossom had formed a plan under which
desegregation would begin almost immediately, in two high schools as soon as

construction reached completion by 1956, and in junior high schools by
1957.16 For several months, Blosso m promoted the plan before the academic
community and the public at large. 17

In May of 1955, however, the school board approved a second and less
ambiti ous plan. It limited desegregation to but one high school, Central High
School, to the extent of allowing entrance to "only a handful of black chil
dren."18 The plan would not desegregate junior high and elementary schools
until years later. 19

This, the school board and its superintendent explained,

was "consistent with an absolute minimum of what the law required."20
Little R oc k s grudging willingness to desegregate its schools went hand in
'

hand with the Supreme Court's second decision bearing the name Brow n

v.

Board of Education.21 Brown II, decided May 31, 1955, provided that district
courts imple menting desegregation need not order immediate and full desegre
gation but should take cognizanc e of local conditions. Desegregation, the
,

Court said,

sho uld take place not immediately but "with all deliberate

12.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

13.

163 U.S. 537 (1896).

14. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494.
15.

FREYER, supra note 10, at 15.

16. Id. at 16. The overall outlines of the plan were extensive:
In the eastern part of the city a new all-black junior high school was being built. Ac
cording to the Blossom Plan, this would instead become an integrated high school (subse
quently named Horace Mann High School), and Dunbar, the existing black high school,
would become a junior high whose student body would remain black. A second high school
(subsequently called Hall High School) was under construction in the western part of Little
Rock; it, too, would be integrated on completion, probably in September 1956. The next
year the junior high schools would be integrated. The date for integration of the elementary
schools was left u nclear, but Blossom expected the process to occur more slowly. Finally,
the board would outline several school attendance zones throughout the city. Assignment
of students to these zones was to be made without regard to race. For several months,
Blos som promoted his plan before various white business organizations and Black and

White parent groups.
Note that this plan did not desegregate existing high schools, that the details of junior high
desegregation were
left unspecified, and that the date of desegregation for elementary school was
nebu lous and that actual desegregation for these was expected to move even more slowly.

17. Id.
18. Id. at 16, 1 7 .

l 9. A second phase would open the junior h i g h schools o f a few blacks b y 1960. N o specific
date for integration of the elementary schools was set, but the fall of 1963 was considered a
strong possibility. Children would be allowed to transfer out of districts where their race
was in a minority, which virtually assured that Horace Mann High, when opened. would lie
all Black. Finally, the Phase Program provided for a selective screening process that mad,· it
certain that only a small number of black children would attend Central.
Id. at 17.
20.
21.

Id.
349 u .s. 294 ( 1955).
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s brief filed N o vembe r 15, 1954 in
speed."22 The state of Arkansas in its amicu
Between fall 1954 and May 1 955
Brown J/23 had supported this position.24
"along lines remarkably consis
the Little Rock School board revised its plan
the Supreme Court issued the
when
effect,
In
tent" with the state's brief.25
ed the [new] Blossom
sanction
tly
opinion in Brown II, "it therefore indirec
Plan."26

After a period of internal dissension within the local branch of the Na
(NAACP) and the
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People
Little Rock Black community,27 the NAACP, in order to force the pace of
desegregation in Little Rock,28 filed suit in February 1956 on behalf of thirty
three children not allowed to register at White schools. This request was re
jected by the federal courts, 29 but not before the matter of school desegrega
tion became an issue in the 1956 Arkansas gubernatorial campaign.
Orval Faubus had taken office as governor of Arkansas in 1955, 30 but

because of a two-year term of office, campaign ing was a constant, though not
always formal activity. In September 1955, Faubus was warned that a refusal
to actively support school segregation would lead to opposition in the 1956
race; Faubus' position that whatever he might do "might only aggravate the
situation" was not acceptable.31 Indeed, Faubus drew opposition based on the
segregation issue in the 1956 campaign, in which he was accused of " 'pussy
footing' on the integration question and ... wait[ing] for sentiment to develop
"32
before taking a stand
.

Id.

22.

at 300.

23.

Amicus Brief of the Attorney General of Arkansas, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S.

24.

Id.

at 7-13.

Id.
Id.

at 42-45.

294 (1955) reprinted in 4 9 A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 831 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Brief].
25. FR EYER, supra note 10, at 35.
26.
27.

28. FREYER, supra note 10, at 45. The NAACP's reasoning was this:
Our objective is to secure the prompt and orderly end of segregation in the public schools.
We want a�I children, regardless of race, to have the opportunity to go to the public schools
nearest their homes. We seek an end to the hazards inconveniences and discrimination of a
system which now requires little children to pass e ch day several schools from which they
are barred because of race and to travel nearly 10 miles to racially designated schools....
.
.
We are unw11lmg to connive by continued silence at such blows against t h e welfare of
our young people, and so we have entered this suit.
The school b�ard has announced what it calls a "three-phase" plan for desegregation .
It has, however given no fixed dates for integration at any level and not even the vaguest
target dates for integration at the elementary and junior high level. Meanwhile, it proposes
to allow young children to endure indefinitely unnecessary hazards of needless daily travel.
Its policy continues to exclude "legro boys from the training necessary for many impor tant
trades m technical fields. School authorities have refused relief even on these points and
have thus
dnven us to ask the courts for needed relief for the children now in school.
.
Interview w11h J. C. C renchaw, president of the Little Rock NAACP, as
reported by the Arkansas
Democrat, February 8, 1956, at 1, as excerpted in W. RECORD & J. RECORD LITTLE ROCK U.S.A.

;

•

.

12 (1960).
29. Aaron

'

v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp.855 (E.D. A r k 1956), aff'd 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1957). A
desrnptlOn of, the tnal and mitial decision in Aaron may be found
in FREYER, supra note 10, at 54-59.
.
3� . FRE\ l:R
su�ra n�te 10, at 23; FAUBUS, DO W N FROM THE HILLS, supra note 5, at 72-74; 11
'.
Wuo IN 1 HE Sou fH AND SOUTHWEST 1969- 70, at
325 (1969) [hereinaf ter cited as Wtto's
.

.

�:�t
.�I.
l8,

32.

at

supra note 10, at 65.
Southern School News, August 1956, at 3, re rinted
in w. RECORD & J. RECORD supra note
p
!9. Faubus mamtamed that "segregation was
a minor issue because all the candi ates agreed
FREYER,

d
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In particular, segregation was brought to the fore by the candidacy of
James Johnson, a former state se nator who in 1954 had lost a statewide race
for attorney general, and who had found in segregation a new and popular
issue.33

Johnson had gained some notoriety in opposing desegregation of

schools in Hoxie. Arkansas, a tiny town which had sought to voluntarily de
segregate its schools - because "it was 'right in the sight of God,' necessary

beca use of the Brmvn decisions, a n d 'cheaper' "·�4 - only to be o pposed by a
statewide, even interstate network of segregationists who threatened violence,
intimidated members of the school board and parents of Black children, and
engenderd a boycott of Hoxie schools. 35 A federal injunction put a stop to the
op position, 3<> but the op position had already reaped a significant result in the
prominence of the name of James Johnson as a vigorous and imaginative
segregationist. 37
Johnson became convinced of the sense of the doctrine of interpostion;
the state, he thought, could and should interpose itself between the federal
courts and the people of the state on the issue of segregation. 38 He proposed
in late 1955 thre e measures meant to forestall desegregation. The first was a
state constitutional amendment directing the legislature to "take ap propriate
action " to evad e the Brown decisions. The second was an act meant to effectu
ate pupil assignment on grounds other than race. The third was a resolution
of interposition placing the state on record against desegregation.39 These
measures met with success in the November 1956 election, but Johnson's can
didacy, which the measures, in part, were meant to foster, did not.40
Governor Faubus had understood the need to position himself in favor of
segregation,41 a n d had understood that as the perceived segregationist candi
date, Johnson was the candidate to beat. 42 As a result, Faubus jumped on the
interposition bandwagon and, turning the issue to good a d vantage, won in a
landslide.43 Faubus' position had implications, however, that in Little Rock
proved critical.
When the Arkansas legislature met in February 1957, it passed several
statutes meant to maintain school segregation, and Governor Faubus felt con
strained to support them.44 This put Faubus and the legislature at odds with
on the subject," b u t promised there would be "no breakdown of the state's traditional segregation
pattern." Id.

33. FREYE R, supra note 10, at 68. Southern School News August 1956, at 3, reprinted in W.
RECO RD & J. RECO RD, supra note 28, at 19.
34. FREYER, supra note 10, at 64.
35. Hoxie S c hool District No. 46 v. Brewer, 135 F. Supp. 296, (E.D. Ark. 1955). Order for
Injunction printed in 1 RACE REL. LAW REP. 43, 45 (1956).
36. Id. See F reyer's discussion of the Hoxie incident at 63-68.
37.

FREYER, supra note 10, at 68.
38 . Id. at 70.
39. Id. at 70-71, 79-80, 87-88. Southern School News December 1956, at 8, reprinted in W.
REC ORD & J. RECORD, supra note 28, at 27.
40. Southern School News, December 1956, at 8, reprinted in W. RECORD & J. R ECORD, supra
note 28, at 26. FREYER, supra note 10, at 81.

41. FREYER, supra note 10, at 75.
42. Id. at 78.
43. Id. at 81; FAUBUS DOWN FROM THE HILLS, supra note 5, at 141.
44. Once interposition formally became p a rt of the state's law in November' legislators in
.
the upc oming session of 1957 were bound to consider a number of segr gat10n
measures.
�
One such prop osal (a result of Amendment 4 7) would create a state sovereignty comm1ss10n
with exten sive investigative and police powers. Newly elected state attorney general Bruce
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Little Rock, who in March 1957 elected
the school board a n d the people of
.
.
45
Faubus' p osiover two segregatiomsts.
two moderates to the school board
wh
ha
tionists
obstructe
segrega
of
d deseg
�
tion was in concert with the band
Little
same
m
the
Rock.
do
As the
regation in Hoxie a n d who now sought to
to
concern
caused
ion
the
opposit
this
sch ool
on
wore
r
summe
spring and
rd.46
go
forwa
plan
their
let
to
ined
board, who were d eterm
In late August of 1957, the situation grew tense. On August 22nd, Gov
r
ernor Marvin Griffin of Georgia, a guest of Governo Faubus a t the Arkansas
using segregationist
rabble-ro
a
delivered
Rock,
Little
governor's mansion in
on of deseg
citizen
percepti
hanged
c
speech. Faubus claimed that the speech

�

regation, such that now the governor feared violence at Central High.47
Whether violence was an honest concern of Faubus is not clear. Two days
before Griffin's speech, Faubus had talked with a United States Justice De
partment official about the subject,48 and o n August 29th in a state court pro
ceeding he had instigated to enjoin the school board from desegregating
Central High School, 49 Faubus testified to his fear of violence. 50 On neither of

these occasions did Faubus state the b asis for his concern. 51 Moreover,
Faubus' concern was belied in the state court proceeding by t h e testimony of
Superintendent Blossom that he had no expectation of trouble, 52 and by the
later finding of a federal district court that until September 2nd "no acts of
violence or threats of violence in connection with the carrying out of the plan
had occurred. "53 Nonetheless, as a result of Faubus' testimony, a state judge
on August 22nd granted an injunction against the September 3 desegregation,
an injunction which itself was enjoined by a federal judge on August 30th.54
Bennett sponsored other legislation requiring supporters of desegregation, particularly local
NAACP branches, to register and make public reports of their activities. And , finally, Gov
ernor Faubus pushed for his own enactments: one to relieve school children of c ompulsory
attendance in racially mixed school districts, the other to authorize school districts to hire
legal counsel to defend school boards and school officials in suits involving desegregation.
Although he had not sponsored them, Faubus publicly supported the Bennett and sover
. .
eignty comm1ss1on measures, despite their doubtful constitutionality and threat to civil
liberties.

F REYER, supra note 1 0, at 88-89 (footnotes omitted).
45. Id. at 92.

46. Id. at 93-98. The influence of the federal government on the positions of Faubus and of the
board was minimal.
President Eise�hower had prnvided little direct public support for desegregation in general,
.
and .m
a public statement m July 1957 he said that use of federal forces t o enforce the
prm1c1ple was unlikely. Neither the president n o r the Justice Department resisted Gover
nor Allan Shiver , s use of Rangers to reestablish segregation in several Texas comm unities
a't. er desegregation had resulted in disorder! crowds. Division in the president's cabi net
�
had .also prevented vigorous executive lobbying for a new civil
rights bill, which enabled
.
southern congressio nal leaders to s1gmficantly weaken the measure
during the summer of
1957.

FREYl'R, supra note 10, at 98-99 (footnotes omitted).
47. Id. at 100-01.

48. Id. at IOI.
49. Id.

at

Id.

at

SO. Id.

51.

�-2;

,e
chi

. .

/d

102.

101-02.

��t d0?·

es. po

tv,tor�over, when asked about

li e

Govern or Faubus' statement, Little Rock's po c
�' ;�\s say I hav.en . t heard what Govern
or Faubus says he hears"
Southern School
.

Nc\\ s Septem er ,
' at 6 reprinted in W. RECORD & J.
RECORD' supra note 28 ' at 31 34.
53. Aaron v. Coope r, 156 F . Supp. 220, 225 (E.D
54.

. Ark 1957).

- '

Aaron v. Cooper, (E.D. Ark. Civ. No. 3113
August 30, 1957), reprillled in 2 RACE REL.

NAL
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In spite of this loss in federa l court, Governor Faubus on September 2nd
issued a proclamation calling out the Arkansas National Guard,55 and ex

plained that because of an "imminent danger of tumult, riot and breach of
peace and the doing of violence to p ersons and property,"56 he had charged
the Guard to prevent, "for the time being," desegregation at Central High
School. 57
On September 3rd, the school board petitioned the federal district court
for instructions, 58 and the court ordered implementation of the plan "immedi
ately and without delay."59 The following day, the National Guardsmen none
theless blocked the entrance of the nine Black students, and pictures and
reports of the abuse of one student appeared around the nation and the
world. 60 That same day, Governor Faubus telegramed President Eisenhower,
disclaiming any interest in "integration vs. segregation," and claimed that the
LAW REP. 934 (I 957). FREYER, supra note 10, at 102. Southern School News September 1957, at 6,
reprinred in W. RECO R D & J. RECORD supra note 28, at 33, 34.
,

55. 0. Faubus, Proclamation, Sept. 2, 1957, reprinted in 2 RACE REL. LAW REP. 937.
56. Id.
57.

0. Faubus, Television Address, September 2, 1957, reprinted in W. RECORD &

J.

RECORD,

supra noce 28, at 37.
58.

Petition of William G.Cooper et al., Aaron v.Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957)

reprinted in 2 RACE REL. LAW REP. 937.
59. Ord er A aron v.Cooper, 156 F.Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957) reprinted in 2 RACE REL LAW
REP. 938, 939.
.

60. FREYER, supra note 10, at 104 and sources cited therein, at I 14, 68. EYES ON THE PRIZE,
supra noce 9, ac IO I, 102. The simple word "abuse" does not fully describe the ordeal suffered by the

student. Elizabeth Eckford:
Getting off the bus near Central High, Eckford saw a throng of white people and hun
dreds of armed soldiers. But the presence of the guardsmen reassured her. The superinten
dent had told the black students to come i n through the main entrance at the front of the
school, so Elizabeth headed in that direction. "I looked at all the people and thought,
'Maybe I ' ll be safe if I walk down the block to the front entrance behind the guards,'" she
r�members. "At the corner I tried to pass through the long lines of guards around the
school so as to enter the grounds behind them. One [soldier] pointed across the street ... so
I walked across the street conscious of the crowd that stood there, but they moved away
from me ... [Then] the crowd began to follow me, calling me names. I still wasn't afraid
.1us1 a little bit nervous. Then my knees started to shake all of a sudden and I wondered
whether I could m ake it to the center entrance a block away. It was the longest block I ever
walked in my whole life. Even so, I wasn't too scared, because all the time I kept thinking
1h,· [ guard s] would protect me.
"When I g o t in front of the school, I went up to a guard again," sh e continues. "He
ju,l looked straight ahead and didn't move to let me pass. I didn't know what to do ...Just
then the g uar d s let some white students through ...I walked up to the guard who had let
[lhemj in. He too didn't move. When I tried to squeeze past him, he raised his ba yonet,
and lhrn the o t h er guards moved in an d raised thei r bayonets
Somebody started yelling,
'l.ynch hcr1 Lynch her!
-

.

'

.

.

"

"I lried t o see a friendly face somewhere in
inlo the face of an old woman, and it seemed a
she spat o n m e."

the m ob ... ," Elizabeth r ecalls.
kind face, b ut when I looked at

"[looked
her a gain,

The young w oma n heard someone snarl, "No n igger bi1ch is going to get in our school.
( iet out of here." The guards looked on impassively; Eckford was on her own. "I looke d
down l hc hlock and saw a bench at 1he bus stop. Then I lhought, 'If I can o nly get lhcrc, I
will he safe.·
She ran to the bench and sat down, bul a duster of ru ffian s had followed her.
"Drag her OVl'r to the tree," said one of them, calling for a lynching.
Tht·n Be njamin Fine, an education writer for the New York Time s put his arm around
Eli1ahe1h. "He raised my chin and said. D on ' t let them sec you cry,' .. she recalls. Fm ally
"

.

:1

'

white woman nam ed Grace Lorch, whose husband taught at a local black colkge. guided
Fli1aheth a\vav from th e mob. The two tried to enter a nearby drugst<)rc to call a cab. but
snmrnne slam�ncd the door in their faces. Then they spotted a h us coming and quickly
hnardcd it. Lorch accompanied Elizabe t h h o m e sa fely but the experience had kft ih mark.
.
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sovereign state can exercise his co n
issue "now is whether or not a head of a
peace and good order within
stitutional powers and discretion in maintaining
"61
.
his jurisdiction . ..
on September 5th
Federal Judge Ronald Davies, presidin g over the case,
the disruption of the deseg
requested that the Justice Department investi gate
the school board's request
down
turned
7th
er
r egation plan,62 and on Septemb
er 9th, Judge Davies re
Septemb
On
to suspend the desegregation plan. 63
ceived the Justice Department's report and directed the department to file a
petition for injunction against Governor Faubus.64 A hearing on the matter
was set for September 20.65 Negotiations in the meantime with federal offi

cials, including the President, resolved nothing except that Faubus would obey
the decision of the federal district court. 66
At the hearing on Friday, September 20th, no evidence was presented
that showed a concern for violence before September 3rd, and as a result an
order ensued enjoining the governor's actions. 67 In response Faubus withdrew
the Guard but claimed that a "crucifixion" would be coming.68 When the
following Monday came, Faubus turned out to be nearly correct, for a nearly
rioting crowd outside the school caused the withdrawal of the Black students
b efore the day was finished. 69 The following day, none of the Black students
Afterwards, the fifteen-year-old sometimes woke in t h e night, terrified, screaming about the
mob.
EYES ON THE PRIZE, supra note 2, at 10 1 -02. The call for a lynching was not necessarily rhetorical.

Barely two years before, in August 1955 a fifteen-year old Black boy was lynched in Money, Missis

sippi. Id. at 37-57. See also s. WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DEL TA: THE STOR Y OF E MMITT TILL

(1988).

One of the last recorded racial lynchings in the nation occurred two years after the Little

Rock crisis, in 1959 in Lumbarton, Mississippi. See H. SMEAD, BLOOD JUSTICE: THE LYNCHING OF
MACK CHARLES PARKER xi (1986).

61.

Telegram, September 4, 19 57, Orval Faubus to President Eisenhower, printed in Southern

School News October, 1957, at 1-2, excerpted at W. RECORD & J. RECORD, supra note 28, at 39.
FREYER, supra note 10, a t 105.

62. Id.
63.

Id. Aaron v. Cooper, Civil Action No. 31 1 3 (E.D. Ark. Septemeber 7, 1957). Order, re

printed in 2 RACE REL LAW REP. 941; oral statement in support thereof, Id. at 940. FREYER, supra
note 1 0, at 105.
64. FREYER, supra note 10 at 106.
65.

66.

Id.
Id. Federal officials failed to take a strong stand against Governor Faubus. "Negotiations

came to focus on findm some means for Faubus to retreat without making it seem that he was
�
backmg ct own w1Hmgly. . Id. See also Governor Faubus' description of his meeting on September
.
with President Eisenhower. FAUBUS, DOWN FROM THE HILLS supra note 5, at 2 5 5-5 8 . No public
pressure was put on Faubus to change his stance. President Eisenhower, for example, after meeting
with Faubus stated that h e was "gratified by [the Governor's] constructive and cooperative atti

tude....(and] was pleased to hear from the Governor of the progress already made in the elimina
.
lton of segregation mother activites in the State of Arkansas." D. Eisenhower, Statement September
14, 1 957 . 1957 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 1 , a 674. Brooks Hays, a representa
.
tive in Congress
�
.
representing Little Rock, sugges e
t d that the President federalize the National Guard and neutralize
.
. authority, but
the governors
this suggestion was disallo w ed by federaI negot'Ja tors. FREYER, supra
note I 0, at I 06 .
67. F R EYE R, supra note 10 at 107. Aaron v.Cooper , 156
F. Supp . 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957).
68. FREYFR, s11pra note 10, at 107.
69. Id. at 107, 108. Se_e EYES ON THE PRIZE, supra note
2, at 105, 1 06:
_
The black Journalists arrived
at Central seconds before the st d
u ents A s th e ,.
•our got
.
.
•
out of their car, the 8:45 school bell rang. Suddenly some
one m the throng o f hun dre ds o f
w h.t
1 es ye ti ed . "Loo k , here t hey come!" The reporte
rs had a par ntly been mistaken �or
parents escorting their children to school.About twent
Y w h tes egan to chase the men
down the street· others soon followed. Newsman Alex
Wilson ch se not to fl e e an d was
?
savaged. "Somebody had a brick in his hand , ,, remembers
James Hicks, another of Jour nal•

·

·

·

f

�

·
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attended, but another crowd was present at the school, bent on preventing the
desegregation of Central High School. 70
President Eisenhower took action in response to the two days' events. On
September 23, 1957, he released a statement promising to use "the full power
of the United States including whatever force may be necessary to prevent any
obstruction of the law and to carry out the orders of the Federal Court. "71 On
September 24th, Eisenhower ordered regular army troops to Little Rock to
protect the students, and federalized the Arkansas National Guard as well, as
much to prevent their use for any contrary purpose as to aid in the protection
of the students. 72
The soldiers of the lOlst Airborne Division left Little Rock on November
27, 1957 and were replaced at Central High School by the federalized Na

tional Guard. 73 By this time opposition to desegregation was fixed, and there
was still a good deal of unrest at the school. 74 As a result the school board
ists, "an� instead of throwing the brick, 'cause he was too close, he hit Alex Wilson up the
side of his head .. . Wilson was more than six feet tall, an ex-Marine-he went down like a
tree."
• • •

With the students out of reach, the mob turned its anger on white journalists on the
sc �ne. Life magazine reporter Paul Welch and two photographers, Grey Villet and Francis
Miller, were harrassed and beaten. The photographers' equipment was smashed to the
ground. The crowd began to chant to the white students now staring out of Central's win
dows, "Don't stay in there with them."
Before noon the mob had swelled to about a thousand people, and Police Chief Gene
Smit h felt compe lled to quell the rioting by removing the black students from the school.
70. FREYER, supra note 10, at 108. On September 24, "11 persons [were arrested], including two
you ths who appear
ed to be of high school age. All were white men. That brought the number of
arre sts for the two
days to 44, including both whites and Negroes." R. Morin, Sacramento Bee,
September 24, 195
7, at I, A6., reprinted in W. RECORD & J. RECORD, supra note 28, at 67, 68.
71. D. Eise nhowe
r, Statement, September 23, 1957, 1957 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note I, at 689.
72. FRE YER, supra
note 10, at 108. Technically, Eisenhower merely directed the Secretary of
Def ense to take
"appropriate steps" to enforce the court's order in Little Rock, and to federalize units
of the Arkansas
guard "as he may deem appropriate." Executive Order 10,730, supra note I.
73. Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. I, 13 (1958).
74. See, e.g., the notes
of Arkansas Gazette reporters in Southern School News, January 1958,
reprinted in
W. RECORD & J. RECORD, supra note 28, at 84:
considerable amount of remarks, "Hey, nigger" when the Negroes walk around the corri
.
dors. Several have been run into "on purpose" and their books knocke� out of their arms.
Most of this seems to be done by sophomores and juniors, not the seniors.
"' "' .

Reportedly the most unpopular [Negro] is Minnie Brown-;�no�n .as ."The Big M"
because of her size. Termed "the type who would cause a fight, �mme, it seem�, t�l �s
back (the others don't) and reportedly sometimes not in a very lady-hke manner. Mmme ts
supposed to have asked a white boy in a classroom to move his foot. He refused. She
stepped on his foot and he slapped her. She went rushing outside for her IO!st guard, the
teacher told him to stay outside, that that was her classroom and that she would take care
of the situation. He did and she did.
Id. Mi nnie
Brown's tendency to retaliate led to disciplinary action against her:
Shortly before Christmas, one of the Little Rock Nine �ecided, to fight back. "For a
couple of weeks there had been a number of white kids following us, , recalls Ernest Gre�n,
"�ontinuously calling us niggers. 'Nigger, nigger, nigger' -one right afte.r the other. Mm
. kid wh� was much
. white
nteJean Brown was in the lunch line with me, and there was t� 1s
shorter than Minnie . .. he reminded me of a small dog yelping at somebod� 5. leg:
Mmme, wh.Y
"Minnie had just picked up her chili, and before I could even say
don't you tell him to shut up?' Minnie . . . turned around and.took that ch1h and dum��d it
on the dude's head." For a moment, the cafeteria was de�d st.lent, Green r�members, and
then the help, all black, broke into applause. And the white kids there d1dn t �no� what to
.
do. It was the first time that anybody [there] had seen .somebody black retahate.
from
The incident led to Minniejean's suspension. Then, m February, she was expelled
· . ·.

·
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sought to postpone desegregation.
The Supreme Court resolved the status of d esegregation in Litt l e Rock by
r u ling on September 1 2, 1 9 58, that desegregati o n would not be suspended and
m ust proceed apace.75
place.

Before this event, however, several other e v ents took

Central High School graduated its fi rst Black student, 76 a n d Orval

Faubus won the nomination of the Democratic P ar t y to a third term as gover
nor by an unprecedent ed sixty-nine percent o f the v ote. 77 Brook s Hays, the
congressman who had counseled moderation, beat a segregationist candidate
i n the Democratic primary, normally tantamount to election,78 but lost in No
vember to a segregationist write-in candidacy initiated two weeks before the
election.79 James Johnson parlayed his high profile on segregation into a seat
o n the Arkansas Supreme Court.

80

In these events are two lessons. The first is that desegregation , as the law
of the land, was inevitable. The second is that pol itical success in the South
often coincided with fervent opposition to desegregation. The cri s i s in Little
Rock was not caused by constitutional theories in conflict, but rat h er by polit
ical surrender to racism.
II.

T HE

PAST

As P ROLOGUE

Arkansas politicians were not the only ones who surrendered to racism.
The United States Supreme Court surrendered or at least compromised with
racism in rendering the implementation form ula of Brown II. While Brown J's

1 9 54 pronouncement that "[s]eparate educational facilities are i n h erently une
qual"8 1 represented a major step forward, the pronouncement of Brown II in

1 9 5 5 that desegregation of schools should be implemented "with all deli berate
speed,"82 represented at least a half step back . District judges were to imple
ment the rule of Brown I "by dealing with 'varied local problems,' according
to 'equitable principles' that were guided by 'practical flexibility' in 'adjusting
and reconciling public and private needs.' "83 Brown II, it has been correctly
Central after a white girl called her a "nigger bitch" and she in turn denounced t he young
woman as "white trash."

EYES ON THE P R IZE supra note 2 , at 1 1 7. Southern School News, March 1 958, at 1, reprinted in W .
RECORD & J: RECORD, supra note 28, at 89, reported Brown's reaction to her expulsion:
,

I just can't take everything they throw at me w i t h out fighting back .
. I don't think people realize w at goes on at Central, she said. "You just wouldn't
_
beheve 1t. They throw rocks, the� spill mk
on your clothes, they call you "nigger," they just
_
keep bothermg you every five mmutes.

�

After Brown's expulsion, students circulated printed cards saying "One Down, Eight to Go." Id.
EYES ON THE PRIZE, supra note 2, at 1 1 7.
75. Cooper v. Aaron, 3 5 8 U.S. I ( 1 958).

76.

EYES ON THE PRIZE, supra note 2, at 1 1 8 . Even at this point racism disrupted the peace of

the school. After the baccalaureate service a graduating senior spat in the face of a black leaving the

ceremony, but was arrested for his deed. Perhaps as a result no incidents were recorded at the gradua
tion ceremony two days later. Southern School News, June 1958, at 10, reprinted in w. RECORD & J .
RECORD, supra note 28, at 9 5 .
77. FREYER, supra note 1 0, at 1 47. EYES O N
78.

FREYER, supra note 1 0 .

79.

Id. at 1 5 7 , 1 58.

80.

Id. at 147.

THE

PRIZE, supra note 2 , at 1 1 8 .

81.

Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.

82.

Brown, 349 U.S. at 300.

83.

FREYER, supra note 1 0, at 9, (quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. at 298-99).
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stated , "reflected compromise and equivocation i n virtually every line. " 8 4
Brown JI, in effect, represen te d a pact between the Supreme Court and the
South : desegregation would occur, but slowly and with delay ample for the
South t o win battles even though it had lost the war. 8 5
The Supreme Court in Brown II failed to consider the implications of the
pre Brown higher education desegregation decisions, and this failure of vision
-

had unfortunate consequences fo r the point the Court attempted to make clear

in Brown I. For these decisions and other cases involving the desegregation o f
higher e ducation constitute a clear suggestion that n o matter how forthright
and lacking in compromise a n d equivocation such a mandate might be, the
South would find ways to avoid and otherwise m i n i mize the effect of court
mandates respecting desegregation.

86

Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada 87 alone makes this suggestion. Decided
in 19 3 8 , Gaines was the first of a series of desegregation decisions by the
Supreme Court before Brown . Gaines found if not its genesis, certainly its im
petus, in the efforts of the NAACP to overcome the legacy of Plessy v. Fergu
88

son .

While

Plessy

had

dealt

specifically

with

segregation

in

public

accommodations, the Supreme Court approved segregation in higher educa
tion in 1 908 in Berea College v. Kentucky, 89 and by 1 927 the Supreme Court
described the doctrine of separate but equal in education as "many times de
cided. "90 The NAACP strategy for overcoming separate but equal was to at84.

H utch inson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decision-making in the Supreme Court, 1 948-

1 958. 68 GEO. L.J. 4, 56 ( 1 979).
85.

T h i s pact was completely at odds with the previous understanding that the constitutional

right to equality of t reatment "is a personal one." McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Rail
way Co., 2 3 5 U. S . IS I, 1 6 1 ( 1 9 1 4). The S upreme Court had long since held that "[i]t is the individu a l
w h o is entitled t o equal protection of t h e laws .

.

. . " Id. a t 1 6 1 , 1 62 . Even i f t h e individual might s t i l l

'"properly c o m plain that his constitutional privilege has been invaded[,]" id. a t 162, under Brown II

an individual whose right to an equal education had been violated might never come to experience

desegregat i o n . Brown II recognized t h a t "the personal interest of t h e plaintiffs" was at stake, but
stated that t h i s interest was only in achieving an equal education "as soon as practicable. " Brown I/,

349 U.S. a t 2 9 9 (emphasis added). The brief in Brown filed in December 1 952 by the U.S. Depar t 
a position, a n d even i t s chief architect, P h i l l i p
Elman. t h o u g h t it was "entirely unprincipled, it was just plain wrong as a matter o f constitutional

m e n t of Justice, was the first suggestion ever o f such

law.

to

suggest that someone whose personal constitutional rights were being violated should be de

nied r.: l i ef.
Elman, The Soliciter General's Office. Justice Frankfurter. and Civil Rights litigation,
l 'i46-J 960: A 11 Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 8 1 7, 827 ( 1 9 8 7 ) . His reason for making this "un
pri n c i p led" suggestion was to assure t h at t he S upreme Court would issue a unanimous opinion i n
llmw11 overru l i n g Plessy. From his discussions with Justice Frankfu rter, Elman viewed the issuance
..

of a u na n i m o u s opinion as important, the alternative to which he viewed as "an incredible godawful
mess: p oss i bly n i ne different opinions, nine different views on the Court. I t would have set back t h e
cause

o f deseg regation; and i t would have damaged the Court. " Id. at 8 2 8, 8 2 9 .

l\6. This is a clear inference t o b e m a d e from M . TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY
A < ; ·\ I NST S E G R EGATED EDUCATION, 1 92 5 - 1 950 ( 1 987).
H7.
XX.

305 U.S. 337 ( 1 938).

1 6 3 U . S . 5 3 7 ( 1 896). While L l oy d Gaines may have wanted to attend the University o f
M i ssouri. t h ere was no guarantee that t h e N A A C P would support h i m simply o n t h i s account. The
NA J\CI' t ook care to properly screen t h e applicants it supported. They had not only to be "qua l i 

ficd . " " hu t " o f outstanding scholarship . . . neat, personable. and unm istakably a Negro." William

Hast ic. staff counsel t o the NAACP, q uoted in TusHNET, supra note 86. at 36. 37. The attack on
'egrcgated education began with graduate and professional education; such chal lenges found plain

t i ffs more readily available and were more easily lit igated since r hc problem to he resolved genera l l y
"separate but equal" but instead "separate and non-existan t . " Id. at 36. 42.

w a s nor

89

2 1 1 U . S . 45 ( 1 908).

90.

G o n g Lum v . Rice, 275 U . S . 7 8 , 86 ( 1 927).
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tack the "equal" part of the separate but e q u a l equation. I n 1 9 3 6 , in Pea rson
v. Murray,9 1 the NAACP convinced the M aryland Supreme C ourt tha t an
out-of-state scholarship program did not provide for Blacks a legal edu cation

equal to that provided for Whites at the U n i versity of Maryland. I n 1 937, in
Gaines the NAACP made a similar attempt before the M issouri Supreme
Court, and failed. 92
The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court , where, in
1 9 3 8, the NAACP won the case.'1·1 While t h e S u p reme Court d i d not chal
lenge the doctrine of separate but equal, t h e Court did recognize as uncon sti
t utional the legislative scheme which allowed Whi tes to attend law school at
the U niversity of Missouri but forbade Black s to do the same, i n t h e absence of
an equal law school for Blacks.94 The fact t hat the legislature had provided
that the state's university for Blacks, Lin c o l n U niversity, had t h e d iscretion to
open a law school was not adequate to overcome the constitutional objection;
the mere legislative purpose to establish t h e separate but equal facility was not
enough.95 The case was remanded to the Missouri Supreme Court for pro
ceedings "not incons i s tent" with the United States Supreme Court opinion.96
The Supreme Court's opinion in Ga ines m a y well have been thought by
detractors of segregation as a great victory, 97 and perhaps the principle estab
lished did constitute such a victory. But t h e authorities in Missouri saw to it
that Gaines himself never saw the fruits o f that victory.
The Missouri Supreme Court rendered its decision on the remanded case
in August 19 39.98 Gaines failed in his attempt to achieve entrance to the Uni
versity of Missouri. The state legislature, between the United St ates Supreme
Court opinion and the second state court o pinion, had enacted i n t o law a pro
vision making mandatory the establishment of a law school for Blacks at
Lincoln Universit y .99

The United States Supreme Court had ruled Gaines
"entitled to be admitted to the State University in the absence of other and
proper provision for his training." 1 00 Since that absence had been redressed ,
the state court held that Gaines had n o right to attend t he University of
Missouri.

Lincoln University, thus, would go on to establish a law school, a school
10
with limited funds, 1 only a small numbe r o f books, 102 located i n a buil din g
91.

1 82 A. 595 (Md. 1 9 36).

92.
93.

1 1 3 S.W 2d 783 (Mo. 1 9 3 7) .
.
305 U . S . 3 3 7 ( 1 93 8).

94.

Id. at 349, 350

The basic considera ton is not as to what sort o f opportuni ties
other states provide, or
_
whether they are as good as those m
M1ssoun, but as to what o portunities Missouri itself
p
furmshes to white s t u dents and demes to negroes solely on the
ground of color. The adm is
s1b1l1ty of laws separatin g the races m the enjoymen t of privileges
afforded b y the state rests
wholly upon the equality of the privileges which t h e laws give
to the separate groups within
the state.

Id.

at

349.

Id. at 346. 347.
Id. at 3 5 2 .
9 7 . The N a t i o n for example, carried an article w h ich termed
the d ec1s1on
· ·
.. a
ma 1.
... ing. an d cause 1-or · · u n 1 1. m 1 l lng reJOtcmg."
. . .
1 47 T H E NATION
95.

96.

,

·

..

(Mo.

·

·

CJ8.

1 3 1 S.W. 2<l 2 1 7

9CJ.

1 9 39 Mo. Laws 6 3 5 . See 1 3 1 S.W. 2d at 2 1 8. 2 1 9 .
Id. a l 2 J K (emphasis su p p l i ed by the Missouri Supreme Court).
_
_
a ppropriated $200,000
The leg1slature
, TUS H N ET, supra note 86,

1 00.

JOI.

1 9 3CJ).

696 ( 1 938) .

at

m1·1 estone,

epoc h

·

7 3 , but the university

NAL
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shared with a motion picture t heater whose sound system treated the law
school's students each day to a distraction from study in the sounds of the
latest in movie entertainment. 1 03 Whether Gaines might have successfully
challenged the new law school's equality to the law school at the University of
Missouri, as the NAACP had planned to test 104 and as the Missouri Supreme
Court had s uggested as Gaines' remedy, 105 is unknown. During the litigation,
Lloyd Gaines had received a m a ster's degree from the University of Michigan
and sometime in 1 9 39 had disappeared . 106 By the end of 1 939, the NAACP
07
was forced to accept a dismissal o f the case. 1
In effect, the Gaines case represented a formula for the frustration of at
tempts to d esegregate education a l institutions. The fi rst element of the formula
was delay. Gaines had applied to law school in 1 9 3 5 and was finally denied
admission in 1 9 39, by which point he had apparently lost interest in law, at
least at the institution he had c hosen originally. The second element was a
willingness on the part of state officials to overlook the intent of Supreme
Court pronouncements on the subject of desegregation and instead to look for
loopholes w hich might allow the choice of segregation to survive. The third
element was state legislative and administrative authority responsiveness t o
less enlightened themes dominating the state's political will, authority deter
mined to place every available o bstacle between its people and its schools on
the one hand, and desegregation on the other.
Each o f these elements was a t work in the crisis surrounding the desegre
gation of Little Rock's Central High School. The Little Rock school board
initially proposed only a modest plan of desegregation, then retreated to a
minimalist plan when the promise of Brown II was anticipated. In short, the
Little Roc k school authorities took what the Supreme Court gave them, and
they took t he good along with t h e bad.
While the response of the school board is not so different from that o f
state authorities i n Gaines, the response of Arkansas' governor and legislature
and of Arkansas' people, who sought to nullify the j udicial mandate of deseg
regation, is. Part of this difference may well be allayed to the emotional impact
of schooling for children as opposed to graduate and professional education
for adults. But part of the difference also must be in an unintended effect of
Brown II. Given suggestions by the Court itself that its own decision in Brown
I might legally be circumvented, state authorites in Little Rock looked for
excus es to believe that the mandate of desegregation was merely an unwel
come suggestion and not the law of the land.
Whether the Supreme Court should have anticipated the resistance of the
South in the form of physical violence cannot be ascertained and is not sug
gested. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court may well have been on notice t hat
the all deliberate speed implementation formula of Bro wn II was merely a call
only controlled a fraction of that amount.

N . Barksdale, The Gaines Case and Its Effect in Negro

Education in Missouri, 5 1 SCHOOL AND SOCI ETY 309, 3 1 2 ( 1 940).
102.

Bluford, The Lloyd Gaines Story, 32 J. OF Eouc. Soc. 242, 244 ( 1 9 5 8).

103.

"Jim Cro w " Law School, 14 NEWSWEEK 3 2 ( 1 939); TUSHNET, supra note 86, at 73.

1 04.

TUSHN ET, supra note 86, at 74.

105.

Gaines, 1 3 1 S . W.2d at 2 1 9 .

106.

Bluford, supra note 102, at 245, 246; TusHN ET. supra note 86, at 74.

1 07.

TUSHNET, supra note 86, at 74.
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though desegre
for and an encour agemen t to official state opposi tion, even
le.
inevitab
be
to
zed
gaton under Brown I should have been recogni
ed by
suggest
is
Notice of the South's politica l will to avoid desegr egation
be
only
can
bear
the Gaines case. How much weight this suggest ion should
de
n
educatio
higher
determined by examin ing the entire history of pre Bro wn
Gaines, then the
segregation. If the suggestion bears the weight indicate d by
its answer in the
of
riddle as to why the Little Rock crisis took place fi nds part
the manner of
in
refusal of the Supreme Court to have been more forthrigh t
-

implementing the moral and constitutional precepts of Brown I.

THE SOUTHERN FAILURE OF J USTIFICATION

III.

Brown
Part II of this Article suggests that the implemen tation formula of
seg
for
sm
II gave encouragement to the White South in its die-hard enthusia
In
on.
regati
regated schools and in its desire for elected officials to resist deseg
o
s
Gaine
��o
the Little Rock crisis, Arkansas public officials went beyond the
�s
untU
ort
opp
sition formula of delay, determination, and clevernes s within the
c
ublt
p
'
sas
Arkan
allowed by law, and actually defied the law. The actions of


officials in turn encouraged White opposition to desegregation.
.
u
This point, however, begs the question of whether there is any con stit
n
a
Ark
by
n
tional rather than political justification for the official actions take
108
sas officials. Whatever the justification, it cannot lie in the first ame ndm ent ,
d
wh ch certainly shields the speech of parties private and publ ic who wou

�

�

resist or even advocate resistance to desegregation. The first amendment, tn
e ect, guarantees the right to disagree, a not inconsiderable right; but the offi 
ci �l state actions precipitating the Little Rock crisis went beyond disagreement
with the mandate of desegregation, subsuming active frustration of that man
date instead.

�

A.

The Call of Localism

.
� sm,
ism.

�he political justifiction offered by Arkansas authorities was that of local
eral 
1 �� effect. a skewed reading of states' rights and consti tutional fed�wn
.
al

The idea that local concerns might take precedence over a na
mandate was not a completely outrageous one. This in fact was th e po mt of
1 08.

the
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishmen
t of religion, or proh ibit ing
_
free exercise thereof; or abndgmg
the freedom of speech, or the press; or the right of th e
people peacebly to assemble, and to petition the Governmen
t for a redress of grie van ces.

CO�ST. A M EN D I.
1 09. I n his inaugural speech for his second term, Governor Faubus stated his opposit ion " "to any
_
forcible integration of our public schools. These matters
people t n
· mus t be Ieft t o the w1·11 of the

U .S.

.
��� d 1stncts.

·

·

articuThe people must decide on the basis of what
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the all deliberate speed formula of Brown II. But in Brown II, the Supreme
Court had cited localism only as a factor to be considered by federal district
courts when implementing the federal mandate, not as an excuse for state au
thorities to override the federal mandate. Localism, as the state obstruction
ists invoked it, was a concept in conflict with the Supremacy Clause of the

Constituti on, which states clearly that the "Constitution . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land . . . anything in the Constitution or laws of any State
to the contrary nontwiths tanding. " 1 1 0
·

In the case of Little Rock, the call to localism is an ironic one, for local
governmental i nterest in Little Rock favored desegregation, and the voices of
111
and indeed,
resistance i n Little Rock originated from outside Little Rock
1 12
outside Arkansas.
The local school board had found a way to live with the
mandate of desegregation, and in this was the will of the local community.
Thus, for Governor Faubus and the Arkansas legislature to truly represent
local interests, they would have given political and administrative support to
the desegregation plan, and not argued localism while in fact frustrating it.

1 13

In calling out the National Guard, the governor had not consulted with
any of the local authorities in Little Rock, who, a federal district court found,
11

"were prepared to cope with any incidents which might arise . . . " 4 Instead
of furthering local interests, the actions of Governor Faubus were quite to the
contrary. The Little Rock school board expressed it well:
.

The effect of [calling out of the National Guard,] was to harden the core of
opposition to the Plan and cause many persons who theretofore had reluc
tantly accepted the Plan to believe that there was some power in the State of
Arkansas which, when exerted, could nullify the Federal law and permit
disobedience of the decree of [the District] Court, and from that date hostil
ity to the Plan was increased and criticism of the officials of the [School]
1 15
District has become more bitter and unrestrained.
1 10.

U . S . CONST. art. I V , c l . 2 .

1 1 1 . Segregationist spokesman and activist James Johnson, a 1 9 57 gubernatorial candidate, hailed
�rom Crossett in southeastern Arkansas. FREYER, supra note 10, at 68. For a description of his not
inc onsi derable influence
on the Little Rock crisis, see FREYER, supra note 10, at 64-66, 68-74 & 78-82.

Governor Faubus himself was from Huntsville in Madison county. FAU BUS, DOWN FROM THE
HILLS, supra note 5, at I, 3. Even though he resided in Little Rock as a state government official in
1949- 53 and after taking office as Governor in 1 955, Faubus was nonetheless a state official and not a
l?cal one. FREYER,
supra note 10, at 2 3 . 1 1 WHO'S WHO supra note 30, at 325. C.f the desegrega
tio n of Hoxie, Arkansas. See FREYER, supra note 10, at 63-68. See also note 1 1 1 infra.
1 1 2. E.g. , Rev. J. A. Lovell of Dallas, Texas was a guest speaker before the Little Rock Capital
Citi zen s' Cou ncil, FREYER, supra note 10, at 93. Marvin Griffin, Governor of Georgia, on August
22� 1 95 7 delivered
in Little Rock a speech which is credited by Freyer and also Gov�rnor Fa_ubus as
bein g responsible
for generating a major change of opinion in Little Rock and as bemg the impetus
for Faubus' dispatch
of the National Guard to prevent desegregation. FREYER, supra note 10, at 1000 1 , 103. See also Southern School News, September 1 95 7 at 7, reprinted in part in W. RECORD & J .
R ECORD, supra
note 2 8 , a t a t 32-33, fo r a report o f Griffin's speech.
1 1 3. See FREYER , supra note 1 0, at 1 1 6 and citations therein. When the governor called out the
.
Nat io nal G uard to prevent desegregation, the mayor of Little Rock noted that "[t]he people of Little
Rock rec ently had a school board election and elected by an overwhelming vote the school board
me mbers who advocated [gradual integration]." In exasperation he offered t hat "were [it] not for my
_
.
_
own res pect for
due process of law, I would be tempted to issue an executive order mterposmg the
Cll y of L ittle
Rock between Gov. Faubus and the Little Rock school board. " Southern School News

Oct ober 1 95 7 p. I , reprinted in W. RECORD & J. R ECORD, supra note 28, at 37.
1 1 4. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. at 10, (citing Aaron v. Cooper, 1 56 F. Supp. 220 at 225).
1 1 5. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. at 10, (quoting the school board's petition before the district
court) .
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In short, the call to localism w as not only m i s p l aced, but hypocri tical as well.
Addtionally, in Little Rock the call to localism was self-servi n g . Whether
local interests were argued to predomina te d e pended on the federal interests at
stake. In the South, "[l]ocalism, manifested a s a general distrust of outsiders
and mixed with a touch of paranoia, whether anti-Communist, anti-semitic, or
1 16
Simil arly
a nti-big business, w as a dynamic element i n souther n attitudes. "
appealed
s]
fervently
politician
to t he
and yet by contrast, " at times, [southern
Constitution as the touchston e of benign n ation al strength; but on other occa

sions they attacked the evil of the federal octopus with all the resolutions of
demogogues." 1 1 7 Where federal power brou g h t economic benefit, it was ex
tolled; but when federal power threatened the Southern way of life, it was
villified. "In such an environment political expediency gave words such as
federal, state's rights, and Constitution a manifestly symbolic meaning." 1 1 8
This framework belies but also explains the assertion of local ism as a jus

tification for the official actions taken opposing desegreg ation i n the Little
Rock crisis. Localism, states' rights, and federalism were concepts that could
not be divorced from the context in which they were raised, and thus offered
no independent justification for any activity undertaken in Little Rock by offi
cial actors opposing desegregation. The bottom line is that offic i a l resistance
i n Little Rock was simply political. The best politics became the politics of
obstruction and resistance.
B.

The Doctrine of In terposition
.

To be sure, this resistance had a purportedly legal basis. The basis was the
doctrine of interposition. Simply put, according to the doctrine, when the fed
eral government or some facet thereof undertook an unconstitutional act, a
state could interpose itself between its citizens and the federal g overnment,
thereby nullifying the power of the federal government to act. B y the time of
the Little Rock crisis, however, the doctrine h ad been completely scuttled as
an acceptable facet of constitutional law.
The doctrine of interposition did not rise fully formed from the heads of
Southern obstructionists, as did Athena rise from the head of Zeus in cl assis
1 1
cal Greek mythology. 9 The classical origin of interposition lies instead in
the writings of such early American giants as J ames Madison and John C.
Calhoun. Madison s a w the power of state governments in this l i g ht:
[I]n case o f a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise [by t h e federal
government] _ of other powers not granted by the said compact, t h e States
_
who are �art1es thereto have the n�ht, and are i n duty bound, to i n terpose
for a �rest _m � the progress �f the evil, and for maintaining, within their re
1 20
.
.
spective ltm1ts, t h e authont1es, nghts, and liberties appertaining to them.
1 1 6.

FREYER, supra note 1 0, at 10- 1 1 .

Id. at 1 1 .
1 1 8 . Id.

1 1 7.

1 1 9. See E. H A M i i.T O N , MYTHOLOGY 29-30 ( 1 940).
1 20. Resolution of Dec . 24, 1 798 VA. STAT. AT LARGE 1 9 2 ( 1 806).
A u t h ored by M a d"son
·
, the
1
·
reso I u t 1011 1s quoted 1· n pan m I R ACE REI LAW R E P . 468. Th omas
Jefferson authored the correspondmg Kentucky n:sol u t 1011 of 1 798. dated Novemb er 1 6, 1 798,
reprinted in E. w A R F I E LD. KEN
1 79 8 75-85 ( 1 894).
TUCKY Rl'SOJ .L:TIO :"S 0 1
K . A N DR ESEN THE T H
E O RY OF STATE
l.!'i T E R l'osn.1or-o TO Cor-;TR�lt F1: � >E R,AI. A CTION 49 ( 1 9
) (Universit y M icroforms Inc. ) (hereinafter
i.: lted .1 ., A N I> K l -. S I·. :-; . S l A ll·. I N l l·. R I OSl t lON). Jeffe
rson s d raft can be fo u n d a t P. FORD, 7 TH E
·

.

..

6?

,
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The powe rs of the federal judiciary were particularly suspect in Madison's
view. He wro te in 1 799 :
However true, therefore, it m a y be that the judicial department is, i n all
questi o n s submitted to it by t h e forms of the Constitution, to decide in the
last resort, this resort must necessarily be deemed the last in relation to the
autho r i t ies of the other depar t m e n t s of the Government; not in relation to
the rights of the parties t o the constitutional compact, from which the judi
cial as well as the other depa r t m e n t s hold their delegated trusts.
On any other hypothesis the del egation of judicial power would annul
the a u t h ority d elegating it; and t h e conc urrence of this department with the
others i n usu rped powers m i g h t s u bvert forever, and beyond the possible
reach of a n y rightful remedy, t h e very Const itution w h i c h a l l were instituted
to preserve.

121

Calhoun emphatically agreed. "This right of interposition . . I conceive to be
22
the fundamental principle of o u r system . " 1 Yet, as Calhoun recognized, on
1 23
the matter of interposition there were two sides to the tale.
.

The c o n t rary argument was p ut by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch
v.

Maryland:
[T]he constituti on and the laws made in pursuance t h ereof are supreme;
. . . t h e y control the const itutions and laws of the respective states and cannot
be cont rolled by them . . . . It is of the very essence of s u premacy, to remove
all obstacles to its action w i t h i n its own sphere, and so to modify every
power vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt i t s own operations
from t h eir own influence.

Since in Ma rbury

v.

1 24

Madison it had already been established that "the p rov
12
5 the

ince and d uty of the judicial d epartment [is] to say what the law is, "

case for those opposing interposition could with McCulloch be considered to
have been closed.
But the arguments over inte r position had preceded Marbury and McCul
loch , and they continued beyond these cases as well. The first ex positions of
the doctrine of interposition in the nation's history under the Constitution
came a scant ten years after the Constitution's ratification, with the enactment
of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1 79 8 . 126 Objecting to these acts on the
ground that they violated the strictures of the first amendment, Kentucky and
Virginia passed resolutions of interposition and urged other states to do the
same. 1 27 A constitutional confrontation was spared when the Alien and Sedi
tion Acts e x p ired in 1 80 1 .
WRITINGS O F THOMAS JEFFERSON 289-309 ( 1 892-99).
Madison,

see

For more o n t h e views of Jefferson and

ANDRESEN, STATE INTERPOSITION 69-78.

1 2 1 . Committee report to Virginia House of Delegates, Session of 1 799-1 800, aut hored by
Madison, quoted at I RACE REL. LAW REP. 469, also reprinted in E. POWELL, N ULLIFICATION AND
SECESSION IN THE UNITED STATES 100-04 ( 1 897).

1 22. J . Calhoun, Address of July 26, 1 8 3 1 , printed in 6 WORKS OF JOHN c. CALHO U N 61 ( 1 83 1 ),
quoted in I R A C E REL. LAW REP. 487.
123 . Id.
1 24. 1 7 U . S . (4 Wheat) 3 1 6, 426-27 ( 1 8 1 9).
1 25. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 1 37, 1 77 ( 1 803).
1 26. Act of June 25, 1 798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 ( 1 798); Act of July 1 4, 1 798, ch. 74, I Stat. 596
(I 798).
1 27. Supra note 1 1 9 :
Actually, t here were four sets o f resolutions, each of the two state legislatures passing
one set in 1 798, with Kentucky passi n g a second set the next year, followed by virginia in
1 800. . . . Copies of the first sets of resolutions were sent to the other states by Kentucky

and Virg i n ia. Nine states replied to Virginia and eight to Kentucky, all disagreeing with the
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The Supreme Court first passed d i rectly on the doctrine of interposition
De ters, t he
P l-I I n rSup rem e Court
in the 1 809 case of United States v. Peters .
jud
a
enforce
to
gment
judge
federal
a
to
agai nst the
amus
d
an
m
of
issued a writ
-

state of Pennsylvan i a . The Pennsylvan ia legislat ure had passed a n act which
had defied an order of the federal circuit court requiring the governor "to
demand for the use of the state of Pennsylv ania, the money w h i ch [was the
1
subject of the judgement in federal court] , " 2'> asserting that the federal court

had had no jurisdiction to hear the case in question as a result of t he eleve nth
amendment.
The Supreme Court in Peters disposed of the elevent h am endment ques
tion against the interest of the state, and in doing so rejected t h e legislature's
resolution of interposition :
If the legislatures of the several states m a y at w i l l , annul t h e j u dgments of
the courts of the U nited States, and destroy t he rig h ts acq u i red u n d e r those
j udgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery. and t h e nation
is deprived of the means of enforcin g its laws by the instrumen t a l i t y of its
own tribunals. . . . If the ultimate right t o d etermine the j u risdic t i on o f the

courts of the Union is placed by the const i t u tion in the several state legisla
t ures, then this a c t concludes the subject; but if that power necessarily re

sides in the supreme judicial tribunal of t h e nation, then the j u r i sd i c t io n of
the District Court of Pennsylvania, over t h e case i n which that j u risdiction
was exercised, ought to be most deliberately examined; and the act of Penn
sylvania, with w hatever repect it may be c o nsidered, cannot be pe r m i t t e d to
30
prejudice the question. 1

The "Pennsylvania Rebellion" did not end, however, with t h e opinion in
Peters, for the st ate continued in the rhetoric and the exercise of i n t erposition.
The governor sent a message to the legisl ature stating his inten tion to call out
the militia to prevent enforcement of the court decree.

The l egisl ature re

sponded with resolutions maintaining " a most exteme state m ent of State·
rights and Nullification" and denying the power of the Supreme Court to have
adjudicated the case. 1 3 1

In the end, when a federal marshal sought to serve

process in connection with the case, he was met with the state militia, and the
general of the militi a was ultimately indicted, arrested, and conv icted for his
deeds, all with the support of James M ad ison, 1 32 then P resident of the United
States. By this time, however, the troops had been withdrawn a n d judgment
had been executed in pursuance of the decree in Peters, and withi n a month of
the general's conviction, he received a p ardon from President MadisonY3
The point had been made, however - the state had no power to oppose the
i nterpositio n ideas expressed i n the interpositi on resolution
s of the two protesting states.
These replies caused the issuance of the second sets of Resolutio
ns.
ANDRES EN, STATE I N T ERPOSITIO N, supra note 1 1 9 , at 48, 49 (foot
notes omitted). These resol utions
are reprinted together m J. ELLIOT, 4 THE DEBATES I N THE SEVERA
L STATE CONV ENTIONS 528-29,
540-44 ( 1 876).
1 2 8.

9 U.S. ( 5 Cranch) 1 1 5 ( 1 809).

1 29 .

Id. at 1 3 5 .

1 30. Id. at 1 36 .
1 3 I.
1 3 2.

1 809 Pa. Laws 2 0 0 , approved April 3, 1 809.
1 RAC E R E L . LAW R EP. 476-77 ( 1 9 56).

1 3 3. Id. The Pennsy lvania Rebellion is d iscusse d in ANDRE SEN,
STATE INTER POSIT ION, supra
note 1 20, al 28-30, and c. W A R R EN, l THE SUPRE M E COURT I N
UNITED ST ATES H ISTORY 96- 1 0 1
( 1 926).
-
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authority of the courts of the federal government, and the federal government
was entirely capable of enforcin g this position.
Each new incident of interposition following Peters resulted in political or
con stitu tional rejection of interposition. In 1 8 1 6, i n Martin v. Hunter's
L essee, 1 34 the Supreme Court rejected the position that Virginia's highest
court could refuse to obey a Supreme Court decision rendered on appeal from
the Virgi n i a court. 135 The H artford Convention of 1 8 1 4, i nvolved New En
glanders who opposed the War of 1 8 1 2, resented the advantages the South
1 6
accured as a result of the three fi fths clause of the Constitution 3 and feared
southern a n d westward expansion, defended interposition by the states i n
cases o f "deliberate, dangerous and p alpable" infractions of the Constitu
tion. 1 3 7

The convention resulted in "the complete a nnihilation from the

American political scene of the Federalist party . . . . " 1 38 In 1 8 1 9, McCulloch
v. Maryland 1 3 9 rejected Maryland's attempt to oppose the institution and con
tinued operation of the Bank of the United States.
South Carolina's Ordinance of Nullification1 40 declaring the federal tariffs
of 1 82 8 1 4 1 and 1 8 3 2 1 42 void within the state met with President Jackson's
quick disp atch of the navy to Charleston Harbor, 143 four companies of artil
lery and fi ve thousand muskets to Fort Moultrie outsid e of Charleston, 144 and
1 34. 14 U. S. (I Wheat) 304 ( 1 8 1 6).
1 3 5 . A bad idea, like bad grass, is hard to kill. This same notion that the Supreme Court w a s
without p o w e r to override a state court w a s afoot when the California Supreme Court refused t o
allow a writ o f error to t h e United States Supreme Court in Johnson
The California legislature responded in 1 8 5 5 by making it a crime for

v.
a

Gordon, 4 Cal. 368 ( 1 854) .
state judge or clerk of court

not to comply with the Federal Judiciary Act of 1 789. Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on
1he Supreme Court, 47 AM. U.L R EV . 1 6 1 , 1 76 ( 1 9 1 3). Later, but over a strong dissenting opinion,
the California Supreme Court acceded to the validity of the act in Ferris v. Cooper, 1 1 Cal. 1 76
(1 858).

136.

U.S. CONST. art I, § 2 read, in part,

Representatives and direct Taxes shall b e apportioned among the several States which may
be included within this Union, according to their respective Num b e rs, which shall be deter
mined by adding to the whole Number of free persons, including t hose bound to Service for
a Term o f Years, excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons . . .
By the terms o f the three-fifths clause, all free persons, whether Black o r White, would be counted.
Slaves, who d id not vote and who could not govern, were counted as sixty percent of a person in the
state in which they resided for purposes of federal apportionment. The South primarily benefitted as
the overwhelming number of slaves resided in that region of the country.

In 1 790, 658 ,000 of the

nation's 698,000 slaves resided in the South; i n 1 800, 857,00 of 893,000; and in 1 8 10, 1 , 1 6 1 ,000 of

1 , 1 9 1 ,000. DEPA RTMENT OF COM MERCE, B U REAU OF THE CEN S U S , NEGRO POPULATION, 1 7901 9 1 5 at 55 ( 1 9 1 8 ).
1 37. REPORT OF THE HARTFORD CONVENTION, printed in T. DWIGHT, HISTORY OF THE HART

FORD CONVEN TION

3 52, 361 ( 1 833).
1 3 8. l R A C E REL. LAW REP. 479-80. See J. BANNER, JR., To THE HARTFORD CONVENTION
( 1 970) and D. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITIC S, 1 765- 1 820, at
278 -82 ( 1 9 7 1 ) .
139. 1 7 U. S. (4 Wheat) 3 1 6 ( 1 8 1 9).
140. S.c. Ordinance of November 24, 1 832, reprinted in STATE PAPER S ON NU LLIFICATION 28
( 1 854).
1 4 1 . Act of May 1 9 , 1 828, ch. 55, 4 Stat. 270 ( 1 828).
142. Act of July 1 4, 1 8 32, ch. 227, 4 Stat. 583 ( 1 832).
143. L etter o f Andrew Jackson to Joel R. Poinsett, December 2, 1 83 2 , printed in W. GOLDSMITH,
I THE G ROWT H OF PRE SIDENTIAL POWER 268, 269 ( 1 974) (hereinafter cited as PRESI DENTIAL
POWER). l R A C E R E L . LAW REP. 486.
144. 1 P R E S IDENT IAL POWER, supra note 1 43, at 285. Letter o f Andrew Jackson to Joel R.
Poinsett supra note 143. Jackson was determined to end the South C arolina threat. In a letter to
Poinsett dated December 9, 18 32, Jackson boasted that if need be, he could place 1 00,000 armed men
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a request to Congress for the enactment of a bill allowing him to enforce the
federal law by use of the military as he saw fit. 145 A compromise ensued. A
less onerous tariff passed Congress on March 2, 1 8 33, 1 46 simultaneous to the
grant of authority Jackson sought, 1 47 and South Carolina withdrew the Stat
8
ute of Nullification. 14
In Worchester v. Georgia, 1 49 the Supreme Court in 1 8 32 heard the appeal
of a conviction in the Georgia courts for failure to obtain a state license to
enter Cherokee Indian territory, permission for which entry had already been
granted under federal authority. The state did not appear before the Supreme
Court to defend the conviction, its legislature having declared any attempt by
the Supreme Court at reversal of any state conviction to be "unconstitutional
and arbitrary," and any appearance before the Supreme Court a compromise
to the dignity of Georgia's sovereignty. 1 50 The men convicted were released
from state custody after the Supreme Court rejected the state's position, call
ing it "repugnant to the constitution, laws,
States."

1 51

and treaties of the United

The intersectional battle over slavery represented the occasion for numerI PRESIDENTIAL POWER 269, 270. In a January 1 3, 1 833
letter to Vice-President Martin Yan Buren, Jackson explained that with troops from North Carolina.

i n South Carolina within eighty days.

Tennessee and the western states he could march with 40,000 men; from Pennsylvania alone he could
depend on 50,000 men, and additionally from North Carolina he could depend on an entire regiment.
I PRESIDENTIAL POWER 2 8 5 , 286.
145.

I RACE R E L . LAW REP. 486. See also A. Jackson, Proclamation, December 1 0, 1 8 32, in 1

PRESIDENTIAL POWER, supra note 143, at 27 1 -85, in which Jackson stated in no uncertain terms the

necessity and his determination to put down the nullification crisis.
1 46.

1 47 .

Act of March 2, 1 8 33, ch. 55, 4 Stat. 629 ( 1 833).

Act of March 2 , 1 8 3 3 , ch. 57, 4 Stat. 632 ( 1 833).

1 48 . S. C. Ordinance of March I S, 1 83 3 , reprinted in STATE PAPERS, s upra note 1 40, at 352. This
was not South Carolina's first step of conciliation and/or capitulation. Within three weeks of Jack 
son's December IO proclamation, the Ways and Means Committeee of the U . S . House of Repres enta
tives proposed to reduce tariffs, and on January 2 1 , 1 83 3 , South Carolina suspended the nulli fication
statute. c. BOUCHER, THE N U L LIFICATION CONTROV ERSY IN SOUTH CAROLIN A 2 7 1 -2 75 ( 1 9 1 6)

(reprinted 1 968) . S. MORRISON and H. COMMAGER, T H E GROWTH OF T H E A M ERICA N REPU BLIC
484 ( 1 942) (hereinafter MORRISON and COMMAGER). The state was not wholly chastened by th e
episode. When the state repealed the statute of nullification, it also passed another nulli fying th e
"force bil l . " S. C. Ordinance of March 1 8 , 1 83 3 , reprinted in STATE PAPERS at 373 . The need to tes t
the new statute was not anticipated, because the state was pleased with the compromise tariff. MOR
RISON and COMMAGER 484.

1 49 .

1 50.

3 1 U .S. (6 Pet.) 5 1 5 ( 1 832).

1 830 Ga. Laws 282, approved Dec. 22, 1 830. The summary of arguments by counsel at 3 1

U.S. ( 6 Pet.) 534, 5 3 5 reveals no argument by the state of Georgia. See also 1 RACE R EL . LA w REP.

490.
1 5 1 . Worchester v, Georgia, 3 1 U.S. (6 Pet . ) at 5 6 1 . Andrew Jackson then Pres dent, is rep uted
i
to have said of this decision, "Well, John Marshall has made his decision, ow Jet him enforce i t . " A .
MCLAUGLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 4 2 9 ( 1 936). This state ment
may have given the state some comfort, but Jackson "did not in fact, refuse to aid in enforcing the

�

Court's decision; and the charge . . . that Jackson actually defied the Court's decrees is clearly un
true." C. W A R REN, 1 SUPREME COURT 769. Instead, Jackson negotiated a settlement of the dis put e
underlying the case, obtammg the release of the men who had been imprisoned for failure to obtai n
_
_
the state license, and m so domg secured the support of Georgia in the South Carolina nulli ficat ion
_
R . RF.MINI, ANDREW JACKSON 1 29-40 ( 1 966). Georgia Resolution of
cns1s.
Novem ber 29. 1 8 32 .
reprinted �n STATE PAPERS 27 1 . See E. Miles, Afier John Marshall 's
Decision: Worchester v. Georgia
a11d the :\ ul/ificatJOll Crms, 39 JOU R N A i . OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 5 3 9 (
1 973). This did not re sol ve
_
the state s recalcitrance on the issue of the authority of the U . S. Supreme
Court. I n 1 8 54, the G eorgi a
Su preme Court considered I tself "co-equal and co-ordinate with the Supreme
Court of the U n i ted
_
and s ubord i nate to that Court . " Padelford, F
States, and not mfenor
ay & Co. v. M ayor and A lder
men of Savannah. 14 Ga. 438, 506 ( 1 854).
.
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ous confl icts between the authori ties of free states and the federal govern
52 which, under the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution and the
ment , 1
acts passe d by Congress to enforce it, had a position on this matter in line with
that of the Southern states. 1 5 ·� By and large, Northern j udges respected the

sup remacy of the federal government, even when they engaged in legal gym
nasti cs to maintain the freedom of those who might otherwise be slaves. 1 54
But Ableman

v.

Booth , 1 5 5 a case decided by the S upreme Court in 1 8 59,

represents a n instance in which t he Wisconsin Supreme Cou rt , because of the
political natu re of a case dealing with slavery, did not s o respect the federal
perogative, releasing by writ of h abeas corpus a federal p risoner accused of
illegally freei n g from federal custody a fugitive slave.

The Wisconsin court

directed its clerk of court to make no return to the writ of error to the United
5
States Supreme Court. 1 6 Wri t i n g for the Court, Chief Justice Roger Taney
rejected the W isconsin court's position, stressing the need for one final voice to
decide all federal issues. The Wisconsin legislature nonetheless passed a reso
lution questioning the need for a s u p reme judicial voice when the nation was
constituted as a union of separate sovereigns. 1 57 The reaction in other North
ern states to this resolution was approval for the position of Wisconsin. 158 By
contrast, in t h e slave South there was approval for Justice Taney's position
an d criticism for that of Wiscons i n . 1 59
The i rony of Abelman

v.

Booth is that commentators in slave states such

as Virginia and Georgia, states which had previously taken strong stands in
favor of interposition, were now applauding the rejection of this doctrine.

1 60

This irony s u g gests that positions on i nterposition develop and change in ac
cordance w i t h whose ox is being gored and whether the pain involved is per152.

See P. F I N K ELMAN, AN I M PERFECT UNION ( 1 98 1 ); R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED ( 1 975).

1 5 3.

D . F E H R E N BACHER, THE DRED S COTT CASE 36-47 ( 1 978).

154.

R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 1 52, at 159- 1 9 1 .

155.

62 U . S . (2 1 How.) 479 ( 1 856). See T . MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY

LAWS OF THE NORTH, 1 7 80- 1 86 1 , at 1 73 - 1 80 ( 1 9 74) (hereinafter cited as FREE MEN ALL) for a
discusssion of t h i s case.
15 6.

62 U . S . (2 1 How.) at 5 1 2.

157.

1 8 5 9 Wis. Laws Joint Resolution IV, p. 247, March 1 9, 1 859.

15 8. See MORR IS, supra note 1 5 5, at 1 86- 1 99.
1 59.

Id. at 1 99-20 1 , 203-204. See also I RAC E REL LAW REP . 495; and note 1 57, infra.

1 60.

Consider the views of Robert Toombs, Senator from Georgia:

On January 24, 1 860, Senator . . . Toombs . . . launched a vitriolic attack on the
legislation of the free states and on t h e recent efforts to obtain laws preventing slave-hunt
ing. On t h e floor of the United States Senate he taunted the "Black Republicans" who
"mock at constitutional obligations, jeer at oaths." In every state where they held power
the Fugitive State Law was a dead letter. It had been nullified, he explained in a later
speec h, by "higher-law" teachings, acts passed under the fraudulent pretense of preventing
kid napping, and "new constructions" such as with the writ of habeas corpus. He was indig
nant partic u larly about the judgments of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and the effort to

obtain a n e w Personal Liberty Law i n New York. Wisconsin, said Toombs, "who got rot
ten befo re she got ripe, comes to us even in the first few years of h e r admission, with her
hands all smeared with the blood of a violated Constitution, all polluted with perjury." The
law intro d uced in New York exceede d those in other states "in iniquity, in plain, open,
shame less, and profligate perfidy."

�R EE MEN ALL, supra note 1 55, at 1 99-200 (footnotes deleted). William Smith, representing Virginia

In the House of
Representatives, called for a special House committee to be instructed to consider the
policy of expel l i n g from the union of states a n y state "which shall, by her legislation, aim to nullify an
act of Cong ress." CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong. 2d Sess., Dec. 17, 1 8 60, 1 07 quoted in FREE MEN ALL,
supra note 1 5 1 , at 203, 204.
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6 1 This suggestion explains the w i l l i n gne
ss of those
ceived to be accep table . 1
a
year
barely
later
Booth
v.
to
en gage in
same states who applauded A bleman
.
sition
interpo
of
act
te
ultima
the
n,
secessio
In the Civil War that followed, secession was crushed . By implic ation,

interposition was rejected, both constitutionally and in terms of national poli
tics. As one Georgia court stated in 1 8 90, "(a]fter the State has yielde d to the

. " 1 62 The
federal army, it can well afford to yield to the federal judiciary
stand of interpositon by Orval Faubus and the Arkansas legi slat u re was thusly
based on grounds other than the thorough l y reprobated doct rine of interposi
.

.

.

tion. Like the call to localism itself, the A rkansas claim to interposition stands
as misplaced, and i n the end hypocritical and self-serving.
IV.
A.

Cooper

v.

AFTERMATH: T H E

AVOIDANCE

OF

ANARC H Y

Aaron

By the end of the 19 57-58 school year, Little Rock's Cent ral High School
had seen not only the appearance of nine Black children on

a

previously all

White campus, but also regular army troops, National G uardsm en, shouting
crowds, and scores of news personnel. The school had become the center of
national attention, and what the nation saw was "chaos, bedlam and tur
moil. "163 There had been "repeated incid ents of more or less serious violence
directed against Negro students and their property, " 1 64 the entire educational
program had been compromised by "tension and unrest, " 1 6 5 a n d in short, "the
situation was 'intolerable. ' " 1 66
This was what the Little Rock school board perceived when it petitioned
the federal district court in February 1 9 5 8 to postpone for two and one-half
years the desegregation of Central High S c hool. The board's position was that
"because of extreme public hostility, . . . engendered largely by the official
attitudes and actions of the Governor and the legislature, the maintenance of a
sound educational program at Central High School, with the Negro students
in attendance, would be impossible. " 1 67 I n June the district court ruled in the
school board's favor, and after the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court in
mid-August, the school board appealed to the Supreme Court . 1 68 In a fast
paced and highly unusual series of moves, the Supreme Court set September
8th as the day on o r before which a petition for certiorari might be filed. 1 69 It
set September 1 1 th as the date for argument, decided the case per curiam on
September 1 2th, 1 '0 and released an extende d opinion on the m atter on Sep
tember 29, 1 958, under the names of each of the nine justice
s. 1 7 1
1 6 1 . _ This sug�estion _is made further by James Madison 's
stand as President of the United States
.
a_gamst mterpo_s1t1on dunng the Pennsylvania rebellion as
opposed
to his stand in its favor during the
_
time of the Ahen and Sed1t1o n Acts. See, supra note 1 20
and text at n. 1 1 8 and 1 26- 1 3 1 .
1 62. Wrought Iron Fence Co. v. Johnson, 8� Ga. 754,
759, I I S.E. 233, 2 3 5 ( 1 890).
1 63. Cooper v. Aaron , 358 U.S. at 13 (quoting the
district court at 163 F s upp. 20-26)
1 64. Id.
·

1 67.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.

1 65 .
1 66.
1 68.

Id. at 1 3- 1 4.

1 69.

Id. at 14.

1 70.

Id. See also 358 U.S. at 5.
358 U.S. I ( 1 958).
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In the September 29th opinion, under the name Cooper v. Aaron , the
Suprem e Court emphasized two m ai n points. The first was that the implemen
tation formula of Brown II, w hile it did not necessarily call for immediate
and/or total desegregation in every circumstance, would not countenance de
lay on the b asis of opposition e n gendered, allowed, implemented, and incited
1 72
by state officials:
[I]n many locations, obed ience to the duty of desegregation would require
the immediate general admission of Negro children, otherwise q ualified as
studen t s for their appropriate classes, at particular sch ools. On other hand,
a District Court, after analysis of the relevant factors (which, of course, ex
cludes hostility to racial desegregation), might conclude that justification ex
isted for not req uiring the present non segregated admission of all qualified
Negro chil dren. . . . the courts should scrutinize the program of the school
authorities to make sure that t hey had developed arrangements pointed to
ward t h e earliest practicable c o mpletion of desegregation, and had taken ap
propriate steps to put their p rogram into effective operation . . . . only a

�

prompt start, diligently and earnestly pursued, to eliminate racial se rega
tion from the public schools could constitute good fait h compliance. 1 3

Thus, three years after Brown II, the Supreme Court recognized the obstruc
tionist gloss that might be put o n Brown II and sought t o overcome that inter
pretation.

Whatever the compromise i ntended by t h e words "all deliberate

speed," t h e Supreme Court served notice in Cooper v. Aaron that it intended
no equivocation about the message of Brown I.
The Supreme Court emphasized also that Brown I h a d been reached by a
unanimous court after "the most serious consideration , " and even with the
advent of t h ree new justices replacing members of t h e Brown I court, the
Supreme Court was yet unanimous in reaffirming Brown J. 1 74 With this em
phasis, the Supreme Court reach ed toward its second m ai n point in Cooper v.
Aaron . No matter how distasteful, Brown l 's stricture that "separate facilities
. . . are i n herently unequal " 1 7 5 was not simply an unpalatable demand of the
Supreme Court to be ignored by states at their pleasure and for the false pro
tection of their citizens. It was i nstead part of the "supreme law of the land,"
binding u n d er the supremacy clause not only on the federal government but
on the states as well . 176
The Supreme Court found a firm basis for this second point in as funda
mental an opinion as Marbury v. Madison, wherein "Chief Justice Marshall,
speaking for a unanimous court, referr(ed] to the Constitution as 'the funda
mental a n d paramount law of the nation,' declar(ing] also that 'It is emphati
cally the province and duty of t h e judical department to say what the law
is.' " 1 7 7 The Court also found s upport even in the words of Chief Justice Ta
ney, a defe n der of the law of White supremacy, 1 78 when he wrote in Ableman
1 7 2.
1 73 .

ld. a t 6 - 7.
Id. a t 7 .
Id. a t 1 9.

1 76.

Cooper v . Aaron, 358 U.S. at

1 74 .
1 7 5.
1 77.
178 .

Brown I, supra note 6, at 494.

1 8.

Id. (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 1 3 7, 177 ( 1 803)).
Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court in Dred Scot/ v. Sanford, 60
U . S. ( 1 9 How.) 393 ( 1 856), which concluded that blacks "are not included and were not intended t o
b e inc luded , u n d e r the word 'citizens' i n t h e Constitution, and therefore c l a i m n o n e of the rights a n d
priv ileges w h ic h t h a t instrument provides for a n d secures t o the citize n s o f the United States . " Id. a t

404. Histo rically, a n d by implication at the t i m e o f t h e decision, Blacks were "regarded a s beings o f
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Booth that the supremacy of the federal government as stipulated in the
Constitution "reflected the framers 'anxiety to p reserve it in full fo rce, in all its

v.

powers, and to guard against resist a nce to o r evasion of i t s authority, on the
part of a State . '

"

1 79

�

As Chi ef Justice Marshal put it in United States v. Peters,

and as the Court in Cooper

v.

Aaron quoted with a p proval, ' 'If the legislatures

of the several states may, at will, annul t he judgments of the courts of the

United States, and destroy the rights acqui red u nd e r those judgments, the conI XO
.
.
.
If b ecomes a so 1emn moc k ery . . . . "
stitut1on
itse
Thus, this second point by the S u p reme Court, that its in terpretation of
the Constitution is supreme law, was mea n t to hopefully la y to final rest the
moribund but undead doctrine of interposition. By exposing t o the light of
constitutional scrut i n y the strategy of state officials in Arkansas, the Court
hoped to ease the course of desegregation t h roughout the South, and not inci
dentally reiterate what Marbury

v.

Madison made clear a cent u ry and a half

earlier, the duty of all to follow the law as established by t he federal judiciary,
in general, and the Supreme Court, in particular.

B.

A Cautionary Note

The events which led to Cooper

v.

A a ron sound a cautionary note about

the anarchy which can ensue when federal a uthority is treated by the states as
less than what the s upremacy clause says, "the supr eme Law o f the Land."181

That is an anarchy that Attorney General Edwin Meese III t h e n invited in his
October 2 1 , 1 9 8 6 speech at Tulane University . 182

Meese argued that Cooper v. Aaron cannot mean what i t says, when it
states that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution is the
supreme law of t h e land. 1 83 If the Coope r v. Aaron court were right, Meese
argues, then each decision by the Supreme Court would be i mmutably fixed
for all time. Plessy v. Ferguson, for example, could not have been overruled by
Brown 1. 1 84 Batson v. Kentucky, 1 85 which guaranteed for each individal de
fendant the right t o be free from racial discrimination in petit jury selection by
allowing proof of discrimination in each case, could not have overruled Swain
v. A lakama. 1 86 whic� made "peremptory challenges to persons o n the basis of
race virtually unrev1ewable under the Constitution "187 And the position of
.
Abraham Lincoln that the Dred Scott 1 8 8 decision was unconsti t utional would
be just as wrong as Lincoln presumed Dred Scott to have been decided
incorrectly.189
an inferior order . . . s o far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to
respect. . . . " Id. at 407.
1 79. Cooper v A aron , 3 5 8 U.S. at 18 (quoting A belma
n, 62 U.S. (21 How . ) 506, 524 ( 1 85 9)).
:
1 80. Id. (quotmg Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 1 1 5 , 1 3 6
( 1 809)).
181.

U.S. CONST., a rt . vi, cl. 2.

Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv.
979 ( 1 987) (herema
· fit er c1· te d as M eese ).
1 8 3. Id. at 986.

1 82.

1 84. Id. at 983.
1 85.

476 U.S. 79 ( 1 9 86).

1 86.

380 U.S. 202 ( 1 965).

1 87.

Meese, supra note 1 82, at 983.

Dred Scott v . Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 Haw.) 393 ( 1 85 6).
Meese, supra note 1 82, at 984, 985. Attorney General
Meese h as not ch osen these exarn pIes
by happenstance. Th ey are meant to tug at our sense of racial
.
.
equity to em tionall
y predi pose an d
'
manipulate his audience toward his position. This is a cheap
shot on Meese s
part . Conspic uous bY
1 8 8.
1 89.

?
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Professor Neuborne has summarized the Meese position better than
Meese has put it himself:
The Attorney General and his executive branch predecessors derive the
executive's asserted legal right to "nonacquiesce" in settled judicial prece
dent from a rigid reading of Marbury v. Madison . In Marbury, Chief Justice
Marshall just ified the judiciary's power over both Congress and the Presi
dent as a necessary incident to the process of resolving a pending judicial
proceeding. According to Marshall, judicial review is merely the ex necessi
tate selection by a judge of a governing rule of law from among the compet
ing candidates put forth by the parties. Even if Marbury establishes that such
an ex necissitate selection is valid within the confines of the judicial branch,
why, the Attorney General asks, should it have self-executing impact on the
future activities of the executive branch as they affect non-parties? While
doctrines of stare decisis or preclusion will often make the outcome of future
judicial proceedings involving the same issues highly predictable, the Attor
ney General argues that strict adherence to Marshall's analysis in Marbury
entitles the executive branch to adhere to its view of the governing law at the
administrative level unless and until the matter once again reaches the
courts, where the judiciary decides the issue. Of course, given the predict
ability of the ultimate judicial outcome, the executive might, as a matter of
respect, prudence, or real politik, elect to recede voluntarily from its legal
position, but according to the Attorney General's theory, the executive is
under no legal obligation to do so. 1 90

This position of Attorney General Meese is not inherently unreasona
ble, ' 'll but it is dangerous. If the Supreme Court is not the final arbiter of the
Constitution, then each branch of the federal government under the Meese
theory of authori tativeness can act alone and at odds with the other. This idea
? f a " caca phonous constitution" lacks the virtues of clarity, finality, practical
ity , and the capability of guidance. 1 92 Only if one locks the Constitution into
its absence from
Meese's speech and even the footnoted publication is any reference to other decisions
havm g nothi ng
to do w i t h race in which the Supreme Court has overruled itself on constitutional
iss ues. See, e.g.
, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 ( 1 98 5 ) (over
rul i ng Natio nal
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 ( 1 976)); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
( 1 969), (ov erru ling Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 3 5 7 ( 1 927)); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 1 86 ( 1 962),
(effectiv ely overr
uling Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 ( 1 946)); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ( 1 96 1 ),
(overruling Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 2 5 ( 1 949)); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 3 1 9
U.S . 624 ( 1 94 3),
(overruling Minersville School Dist. v . Gobitis, 3 1 0 U.S. 586 ( 1 940)); and Erie R . R.
Co. v. Tom pkins, 304
U . S . 64 ( 1 938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 4 1 U.S. ( 1 6 Pet.) I ( 1 842)).

1 90.
( 1 9 87).

Neuborne.

The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TUL. L. REV. 99 1 , 993-94

1 9 1 . See, e. g. , Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 243 THE NATION 689 ( 1 986), re
printed in 6 1
TuL. L. REV. 1 07 1 ( 1 987); Tush net, The Supreme Court, the Supreme Law of the Land,
and A ttorney Ge
neral Meese: A Comment, 6 1 TuL. L. REV. 1 0 1 7 ( 1 987); Colby, Two Views on the
Legitim acy of N
onacquiescence in Judicial Opinions, 6 1 TUL. L. REV. 1 04 1 ( 1 987).
1 92 . Neuborne, supra note 1 90, at 994. The troublesome nature of a constitution without a si!'1gle
au thoritat ive
voice to construe it is not merely recently considered. In Ferris v. Cooper, the Califor
nia Supreme Cou
rt decl ared:
That there should be a central tribunal, having power to give authoritative exposition to the
Constit ution and laws and treaties of the United States, and which should also possess the
'
power to se ure every citizen the rights to which he is entitled under them, seems to us
.
h ighl y expedient. The value of uniformity of decisions wher� t he Const1tut1o n and 1 aws of
.
_
the Fede ral Government are to be expounded in cases of md1v1dual nghts, and the impor
pro
be
and
extent,
e
th
tan ce of the principle that every citizen of the United States know
.
tect ed by a tribunal of the highest authority and free from loca prej udices or pa ss1ons m the
.
enjoym en t of all the rights, exemptio ns, and privileges with which the Const1tut 1on and laws
of the Union invest him, cannot easily be exaggerated. Indeed, m order to render the Con
sti tuti on and laws of the Federal Government the same things to the people of the U n i ted

�
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the jurisprudence of original intention does the Meese position on authorita
tiveness bear virtue, and then only because t h e Constitution is thought not to
be a living document but instead shackled by the perceptions and limitations
of its framers and the framers' times. B y contrast, a Constitu tion not so
shackled is susceptible of different readings over time, in acco rdanc e wi th
changing levels of sophistication and sensibilities. Under such a n interp reta
tion of the Constitution, Lincoln might well argue for a change in the under

standing of the law o f the Constitution underlying the Dred Scott case, and
Brown I might legitimately overrule Plessy

v. Ferguson, all witho ut unde rmin
ing the authoritative nature of Supreme Court pronouncements.

The opposite tack which Attorney General Meese has taken ignores the
danger that underlies Cooper

v.

Aaron , the v e ry case whose statement respect

ing authoritativeness of Supreme Court pronouncements Meese seeks to ques
tion. If the Supreme Court is not the final arbiter of constitutional law, then
the inference may be had that anyone can be an authoritative arbiter of the
Constitution, the position of the Supreme Court notwithstanding. Meese's po
sition gives comfort t o those who would revive the corpse of interposition, and
that specter is an ugly one, as demonstrated by the Little Rock c risis. Out of
this crisis a caution is issued and a warning is sounded, one especially compel
ling for a document over 200 years old.
The warning is this: the Constitution must be the supreme power, and no
local interest can be allowed to predominate over its mandate, n o matter how
important the local interest nor how stubborn its supporters. For there is no
power in a law that is not obeyed, and n o beauty in a Constit ution whose
power dissipates even as it is spoken.

States, it is necessary that they receive their ultimate construction from the same tribunal;
for there is but little practical difference between two or more different Consti t u t ions and
one Constitution variously and differently construed.
1 1 Cal. at 1 80. See also United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 1 1 5, at 1 3 5-36; Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 385 ( 1 82 1 ); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (2 1 Haw.) 506, at 5 1 4- 1 6 ( 1 85 8).

